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Sommario Causes of Effects (COE) queries concern the assessment of causal rela-
tionship in individual cases by evaluating the probability of causation. However is
not always clear how and whether, to usefully employ scientific data for this pour-
pose. Given even a randomized sample we can typically only provide bounds for the
probability of causation if some fundamental conditions, namely exogeneity, com-
parability and sufficiency [4] , are satisfied. In this work we make the fundamental
conditions operative by means of a Bayesian model selection procedure.
Sommario Le problematiche di Cause di Effetti (COE) riguardano la valutazione
di relazioni causali individuali attraverso il calcolo della probabilita` di causazio-
ne. In questo contesto non e` sempre chiaro come utilizzare dati provienti da studi
scientifici. Infatti anche in presenza di esperimenti randomizzati si possono solo cal-
colare degli intervalli per la probabilita` di causazione, qualora siano soddisfatte le
cosı` dette condizioni fondamentali di esogeneita`, comparabilita` e sufficienza [4].
L’obiettivo di questo lavoro e` di rendere operative queste condizioni tramite una
procedura di selezione di modelli in ambito Bayesiano.
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1 Introduction
In causal inference it is important to distinguish two types of causal query which,
although not entirely unconnected, are nevertheless very different, both in form and
in the type of answer they require. The following example traces back to Holland,
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1986 [6] and is archetypical in causal literature.
Effects of Causes (EoC): “ Ann has a headache. She is wondering whether to take
aspirin. Will that cause her headache to disappear?”
Causes of Effects (CoE): “Ann had a headache and took aspirin. Her headache went
away. Was that caused by the aspirin?”
EoC type questions have the form “Will A cause B ?” CoE questions have the form
“Did A cause B ?”, and are also known as problems of individual causation.
How to use scientific data on individual cases is a problem that is central to
the courts of justice and, in forensic literature, is referred as the G2i ( “Group-to-
individual”) problem Dawid et al., (2014) [3]).
In the CoE case, Ann actually chose to take the aspirin (E = 1) and assumed the
drug (T = 1), this produces her headache to disappear (R = 1).
In this work we concentrate on the general CoE setting and more explicitly on
how to support the conditions required to evaluate the probability of causation.
2 Basic of COE
Let’s consider again the CoE example about the aspirin: Ann had a headache and
decided (E = 1) to took aspirin (T = 1). Her headache went away (R = 1). Was that
caused by the aspirin? One possible answer, “Probability of Causation”, PC, relies
on potential responses (R0,R1) (where Rx denotes the value R takes when T = x,
i.e. T is set to x). We know that, for Ann, T = 1 so that R1 = 1: she took the aspirin
and her headache disappeared. Now if in “counterfact” R0 = 1, then Ann’s headache
would have disappeared even if she had not taken the aspirin, so we must conclude
that it was not the aspirin that cured her. Conversely, if R0 = 0 then we can indeed
attribute her cure to having taken the aspirin. Everything must be also evaluated
considering her choice to take the drug, E = 1, which could be informative of her
health status or, in general, on her preference to assume the treatment. In this way
our CoE causal question is formulated in terms of the contrast between the factual
outcome R1 and the counterfactual outcome R0. Formally we can define the PC as
the conditional probability (see, e.g., Dawid et al., (2016) [4])
PCA = Pr(R0 = 0 | HA,E = 1,R1 = 1) = Pr(R0 = 0,R1 = 1 | H
A,E = 1)
Pr(R1 = 1 | HA,E = 1) , (1)
where PCA denotes the judge’s probability distribution over attributes of Ann and
HA the background information, some relevant known information about Ann. We
denote by H a set of variables H = {H1, . . . ,HK} and with HA = {HA1 , . . . ,HAK} their
corresponding values for Ann. This formal approach does however leave open the
questions of how to evaluate PC and what evidence can be used. The numerator
of (1) is not estimable, since we can never observe both R0 and R1 for the same
individual, hence we can never assess this dependence without making any further
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assumptions. CoE questions may simply not have well-determined answers, but we
can sometimes set bounds so long as some fundamental conditions are satisfied
(Dawid et al., (2016) [4]). In such case it is possible to show that
Pr(R0 = 0 | HA,E = 1,R1 = 1)≥max{0,1− 1RRA } (2)
with
RRA :=
Pr(R1 = 1 | HA,E = 1)
Pr(R0 = 1 | HA,E = 1) .
Whenever RRA > 2 the Probability of Causation PCA will exceed 50%. In a civil
court this is often taken as the criterion to assign legal responsibility ”on the balance
of probabilities”. How much information HA to take into account is still an unsol-
ved problem. The aim of this work is to evaluate how different specifications of H
support the fundamental conditions. We pose the issue as a model selection problem
within the class of models induced by the fundamental conditions, where each mo-
del specifies a particular choice for H. Models will be evaluated by considering their
marginal likelihood and a prior on the model space.
3 Fundamental conditions
3.1 Exogeneity
The potential outcomes (R0,R1) have the same joint distribution among both treated
and untreated study subjects having the same background information HA as Ann.
This condition essentially assumes no confounding (R0,R1)⊥⊥T |HA for every spe-
cification of H. This assumption cannot be tested empirically since in the treated pa-
tients we only observe R1 and in the untreated patients we only observe R0. So any
argument we make for exogeneity has to be justified because of the randomization
and ignorance of the influence of the H characteristics on the response.
3.2 Comparability
Conditional on knowledge of the pre-treatment characteristics of Ann and the trial
subjects we can regard Ann’s potential responses as comparable with those of the
treated subjects having characteristics HA.
Comparability essentially says that we are not able to distinguish between Ann and
the group of treated individuals as it concerns the uncertainty of their response to
the treatment. This is nothing but exchangeability, a basic form of dependence in-
troduced by de Finetti. If exchangeability holds, the joint distribution of the random
variables considered for a problem are invariant to permutation, i.e. there is no way
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to make a distinction among them. According to what characteristics are included
in H, different individuals in the randomized sample will be compared with Ann.
Then using the representation theorem we can evaluate the probability to observe
Ann and the group of responses if exchangeability holds among them.
3.3 Sufficiency
Conditional on HA, Ann’s intention to take (or not) the treatment does not affect the
distribution of her potential responses.
This condition requires that, given Ann’s own background information HA, her po-
tential outcomes are not further influenced by her (known) desire to take the aspirin.
We need first too address the condition required to evaluate the denominator of
RRA: Conditional on knowledge of the pre-treatment characteristics of Ann and the
trial subjects, we can regard Ann’s potential responses as comparable with those of
the untreated subjects having characteristics HA. This potential probability clearly
concerns a counterfactual event, since Ann decided and actually took the aspirin;
obviously we don’t know the response if she had not taken the aspirin but we know
her will to assume the drug. We assume that E is observed in the sample: for exam-
ple, a patient entered into a randomized trial is conscious that he may not receive
the treatment but only a placebo and nevertheless agrees to express the wish to take
aspirin or not. The ambition is to evaluate Pr(R0 = 1 | HA,E = 1) using traditio-
nal experimental data for T = 0, without ignoring the decision of Ann to take the
drug, which is observational in nature. E = 1 describes the Ann’s desire to take
the aspirin, information not included in HA but possibly relevant to determine the
probability of the response. If we can obtain reasonable support to the condition
R0⊥⊥E | HA i.e. if (3)
Pr(R0 = 1 | HA,E = 1) = Pr(R0 = 1 | HA,E = 0) (4)
it would be possible to estimate Pr(R0 = 1 | HA,E = 1) by Pr(R = 1 | HA,T = 0).
4 Model selection
We pose the problem of finding the group most fitting the fundamental conditions as
one of model selection solved, as usual, by computing the marginal likelihood, based
on the data, for each possible specifications of H. We have 2K possible different
choices for the characteristics that can be selected from H. Let J be one of these
choices, that can be identified as a subset of {1, . . . ,K}. We introduce an equivalence
relation ∼ on the set of treated individuals that agree to receive the treatment (T =
1,E = 1). Namely if I1 and I2 are two such individuals then
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I1 ∼ I2 ⇐⇒ HI1j = HI2j , ∀ j ∈ J.
A similar definition can be given for the other subgroups (T = 1,E = 0), (T =
0,E = 1) and (T = 0,E = 0). Thus each equivalence relation determines a parti-
tion of one of the above four groups. These four partitions identify a model MJ . We
denote each element of one quotient set by X st,e, where t ∈ {0,1}, e ∈ {0,1} and
s ∈ {0,1,2 . . . ,N}, N−1 being the number of elements of each partition. We reser-
ve the notation X0t,e to the sets of individuals who share all the characteristics with
Ann. Using the same notation as before, we indicate by rt,e the vector of respon-
ses in the main 4 groups, by r{\X} the vector of responses in the complementary
of the set X , by rst,e the vector of responses referred to a specific group of indi-
viduals and by rA the Ann’s response. The responses of the treated and untreated
individuals are not considered exchangeable each other and are modeled separately
using the conditional representation indexed by their own θs, which are a priori as-
sumed independent. So the marginal likelihood we want to evaluate factorizes and
we evaluate each contribution separately.
Pr(rA,r1,1,r1,0r0,1,r0,0|MJ) = (5)
=
∫
ΘT=1
∫
ΘT=0
Pr(rA,r1,1,r1,0r0,1,r0,0,θT=1,θT=0|MJ)dθT=1dθT=0
=
∫
ΘT=1
Pr(rA,r1,1,r1,0,θT=1|MJ)dθT=1
∫
ΘT=0
Pr(r0,1,r0,0,θT=0|MJ)dθT=0.
4.1 Marginal likelihood for comparability
Because of the sufficiency condition, we assume the same mixing parameter θ sT=1
in the sets X s1,1 and X
s
1,0, whose prior is assumed a non-informative Be(1,1), while
for the comparability condition Ann is suppose to be exchengeable with the treated
individuals sharing with Ann the same characteristics. The marginal likelihood is
Pr(rA,r1,1,r1,0|MJ) = Pr
(
rA,r01,1,r
0
1,0,r\{X01,1,X01,0}
)
(6)
=
∫
Θ0T=1
Pr(rA,r01,1,r
0
1,0,θ
0
T=1)dθ
0
T=1 ·∏
s 6=0
∫
Θ sT=1
Pr(rs1,e,θ
s
T=1)dθ
s
T=1 =
=
x01,e +1
n01,e +2
∏
s6=0
1
ns1,e +1
where x01,e is the number of success in the group X
0
1,1∪X01,0, n01,e = |X01,1|+ |X01,0| and
ns1,e = |X s1,1|+ |X s1,0|.
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4.2 Marginal likelihood for sufficiency
The sufficiency assumption requires E to have not influence on the response for
the untreated with the Ann’s characteristics. So, if R0⊥⊥E|HA holds, then the two
groups of r.v., r00,1,r
0
0,0, share a common mixing distribution parameter θ
0
T=0, whose
prior is assumed a non-informative Be(1,1). We denote by θ sT=0,E=e the mixing
parameter in the quotient set X s0,e. The marginal likelihood is:
Pr(r0,1,r0,0|MJ) = Pr(r00,1,r00,0,r\{X00,1,X00,0}) =
∫
Θ0T=0
Pr(r00,1,r
0
0,0,θ
0
T=0)dθ
0
T=0·
∏
s 6=0
∏
e∈{0,1}
∫
Θ sT=0,E=e
Pr(rs0,e,θ
s
T=0,E=e)dθ
s
T=0,E=e
=
(
n00,0
x00,0
)(
n00,1
x00,1
)(
n00,0 +n
0
0,1
x00,0 + x
0
0,1
)−1
· 1
n00,0 +n
0
0,1 +1
∏
s 6=0
∏
e∈{0,1}
1
ns0,e +1
(7)
where we have used a similar notation as before.
Remark 1 (Marginal likelihood and the Irving-Fisher exact test). The marginal li-
kelihood evaluated for a subset of H formally shares the hypergeometric part with
the conditional Irving-Fisher exact test statistic used to evaluate differences among
the rate of success of an event in two populations. The result is not surprising since
we are looking for the set of H making E irrelevant, so supporting the so called H0
hypothesis of no-difference between the success ratio in the two groups.
4.3 Prior and posterior in the model space
By (5), the required marginal likelihood is the product of (6) and (7). The goal is to
evaluate the posterior of MJ given the responses observed on Ann and on the sample.
To this end we introduce a prior over the space of models. The simpler choice is to
consider an uniform distribution on this space. Another choice is this one proposed
by Chen and Chen, (2008) [1]. They give the same prior probability (equal to 1k+1 ) to
all models sharing the same number of characteristics k. In this way for the generic
model MJ we have:
Pr(MJ) =
1
k+1
(
k
|MJ |
)−1
· I(|MJ | ≤ k/2) (8)
where the search spans all models including at most k/2 characteristics. This choice
favours model selection according to the Occam razor principle: the fewer charac-
teristics employed, the more probable is the model. This rationale is reasonably
objective. Combining (6) and (7) and ( 8), we get the required posterior.
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Figura 1 Risk ratios for two individuals who succeded and required the hint
5 An experiment
We carried on an experiment at the University of Florence, School of Engineering,
Fall 2017. We asked to 160 students to solve a simple probabilistic question and
we provided randomly an hint (the treatment T ). Before the test we asked to the
students if they wish to be helped or not (E = 0 and E = 1).
We are interested to investigate if there is a causal relationship between the hint and
the ability to solve the question, for the students who wished to take the hint. We had
8 of these cases and for all of them we found a RR > 2 (obtained by averaging the
results of different models according to their posterior probability, see figure (1)).
This implies a lower bound for the probability of causation greater than 0.5 which
suffices to indicate a causal relation between the hint and the positive result obtained
by the 8 students.
As a result of our experiment we have also that, among the students who asked
and had the hint, 24 did not succeed. We can image that one of them claimed that it
was the hint which caused the failure. If we look now to the corresponding RR for
such students, obtained as before by model averaging, we note that all of them have
a values smaller then 1 (see figure 2). This is not conclusive that there is a causal
relation between the hint and the failure.
In a civil trial this would not suggest to a judge to provide a compensation.
6 Conclusions
We introduced a typical Cause of Effect problem by means of an archetyppical
example considering Ann and the effect of an aspirin on her headache. We have
proposed a possible solution to make operational the choice of variables to include,
so as to validate the fundamental assumptions underlying the assessment of Ann’s
probability of causation. We assume to have the possibility to perform a randomi-
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Figura 2 Risk ratios for two individuals who didn’t succed and required the hint
zed sample from the Ann’s population where, as usual, T is assigned following a
randomized protocol and E, this is a novelty, is a question asking to the members of
the sample about their preference to be treated or not.
Next step will be to extend the methodology to observational studies, to make
possible in a wider range of cases the evaluation of the PCA for Causes of Effects
problems.
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